The Orioles minor league system has come pretty far in the last few years. Today, it stands as an organizational that is listed in the top three farm systems according to Baseball America (9th), Baseball Prospects (7th), and a quantitative method using Victor Wang's prospect worth analysis (6th). A typical response from some of the critics of the Orioles minor league system is that their recent upswing in quality is almost completely connected to Matt Wieters' worth. This is a fairly astute observation as Wieters does account for about a 35% of the MiL worth according to Victor Wang influenced calculations. With Wieters in the mix, the system is worth $112.1MM. You remove Wieters and that number drops to $79.9MM, which would slot us in 18th between the Mets and Reds. Other options would put us at $86.4MM (16th overall, Ross Detwiler), $100.7MM (10th overall, Matt LaPorta), or $88.6MM (16th overall, Philippe Aumont). Word at the time was that the Orioles did not expect Wieters to be there and, even if he was, was more likely to go with Detwiler or Aumont. Matt LaPorta was reported as a possible alternative. That said Joe Jordan has never mentioned who else he may have considered.
With that said, what does this mean for the rankings coming out in February of 2010?
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I'll be focusing on the Wang-related rankings as it makes up for generically ID'ing players with a more quantitative focus.
We can expect Wieters, Montanez, Reimold, and Bergesen to lose their rookie status (Reimold is probably the most arguable of the four to lose it). This would result in a system loss of about $39MM. This would reduce the overall worth of the system to $73MM. It appears as if Arrieta and Matusz will probably keep their value as top 25 pitchers. They both looked good this Spring and do not have shaky command issues, which is a typically value drop from one year to the next. That said, I do not think Matusz' value could increase and I think Arrieta's value is as likely to increase as Tillman's is likely to decrease. So, for the top three, I would probably just call it a push.
Going beyond that, Erbe, Snyder, Hoes, and Drake probably represent the best upside players. I would expect 1 or 2 to make it into BA's top 100 prospects. I think Erbe will sneak into BA's top 100 as he is already in there for other publications. This adds the team worth to $76.8MM. Assuming one of the other three makes it (let's saw Hoes), the value is raised by $10.5MM to $87.1MM. I doubt much else will change.
The draft will also be a contributor to next year's value. Conservatively estimating our selection as rating between the 25th and 50th ranked prospect in baseball and assuming the following picks with not be top 100 players . . . the Orioles are probably looking at an increase in value of $14-20MM. This places their final MiL value at $101.1-107.1MM.
We are probably looking at a loss of 9.7%.
How do you all feel about those assumptions?
Ideally, one would want a system that is operating with at worst a net zero loss in value each year. Losing a top ten player makes that rather difficult.
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The assumptions seem reasonable, though I think it's slightly more likely that they over-estimate the system's worth next year than under-estimate it.
ReplyDeleteIf the hype is to be believed, then replacing Wieters in the system may take a generation. That shouldn't be counted against the team, though I think in some ways it will be.
While it would be nice to maintain or increase the systems value each year, that somewhat ignores the cyclical nature of a teams competitiveness cycle. As good prospects are promoted to the majors, the minor league value will suffer but the big club should become more successful. Then the minors can be built back up. The good clubs are the ones that can minimize the drop and speed up the assent - thus ensuring a constant flow of contributors to the majors. The Braves have been quite good at this, even if their system hasn't ranked that highly every year. The Rays have been up there for several years now, and I'm curious to see how long that lasts as their top prospects keep being called up.
I found it interesting how much more valuable top hitters were projected to be than top pitchers. Does this call into question the Orioles' (apparent) strategy of picking pitchers high in the draft? I know it's "pick the best player available," but the valuation seems to imply that it's more efficient to get the top hitters first and then take your shot at pitchers later (especially if you're willing to go over slot).
Yeah, my problem with Wang's work is that I think it makes an overgeneralization. I think there are differences with respect to potential with hitters and pitchers. I think scouts are more inclined to exaggerate the pitching potential of a player than the hitting potential. I also think there is less accuracy in projecting pitching potential. A guy like Matusz kind of bucks things, in my opinion, because he is so polished.
ReplyDeleteSo what do I think?
Top end of draft should focus on polished pitching and all hitters. Rounds 3-4 overslotting guys with 1st round talent pitching wise. Rounds 7-20 overslotting high school arms.
Top pitching prospects, on average, tend to blow up in a team's face more than hitters. That's basically Wang's assertion.
ReplyDeleteI agree with Jon, I like hitters in the first round unless A) you get a very polished guy like Matusz or B) the guy is universally projected with ridiculous upside. The Orioles have to take some risks every now and then and you don't get true aces unless you take those risks...just pick your spots.
Going after overslotting high school arms in the later rounds...I like that idea too. Very few players of major league caliber come out of those later rounds so why waste them doing things the traditional way? Make a couple of those picks really count for big time talent.
Even this offseason, free agent pitchers are more expensive than hole-plugging hitters. I like MacPhail's emphasis on growing your own pitching. I think it's easier to find a slugging outfielder on the free agent market than a solid number 3 starter.
I think the draft is a puzzle that can be solved with the right amount of data. Jon's approach seems to be along the right lines, but in order to get a generalized "strategy" that will work, we need to figure whether or not we have a budget and what that reasonable budget would be.
ReplyDeleteFor example, in order to use rounds 3-4 on overslot guys, you need to be fairly certain you can sign them since there are still future ML contributors on the board. How much extra do you have to give in round 3 than you would in round 7?
Generally, without looking into any data -- just going off my understanding of the types of players I see around at various points in the draft:
Top positional players:
Round 1 - 3 (college); 4 - 7 (college over slot sophs)
Round 1 - 2 (HS slot); 4 - 15 (HS over slot)
Top starting pitchers/closer:
Rounds 1 - 2 (college)
Rounds 1 - 3 (HS slot/slightly over); 3 - 10 (HS over slot)
Back-end starters/Relief:
Rounds 3 - 10 (college)
N/A (HSers tend to go to college to raise stock)
Role Player:
Rounds 4 - 10 (college)
N/A (HSers tend to go to college to raise stock)
Minor League Filler/Fringe Prospects:
Rounds 11+
This is only "signable" players w/r/t HSers. Someone like Gray doesn't go until the 20th because he's known to be nearly impossible to sign. He'll be one of the top pitchers in college as a soph next Spring as Vandy's Friday arm.